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1 Introduction
“The authority of the chief thus fused in a single person all moments of power: judicial, legislative,
executive, and administrative” (Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa
and the Legacy of Late Colonialism, p.23)
What factors shape individual and community attitudes towards democracy? There is
substantial cross-national and within-country variance in individual support for democratic in-
stitutions. This component of the political or “civic” culture of a society has long been shown
to play a important role in affecting both the sustainability and success of democratic institu-
tions (Almond and Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1990; Putnam, 1994; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).
Yet, beyond a number of recent findings that show that support for democracy is endogenous
to exposure to national democratic institutions (Persson and Tabellini, 2009; Fuchs-Schündeln
and Schündeln, 2015; de Aquino, 2015) we have relatively little quantitative evidence for other
factors behind variation in individual support for democratic institutions. In line with a body of
literature that highlights the importance of colonialism for contemporary political and economic
outcomes (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2002; Iyer, 2010; Hariri, 2012), this
paper argues that indirect and direct colonial rule are important factors in shaping contemporary
support for democracy.
The difficulty in demonstrating the effects of direct and indirect colonialism on contempo-
rary democratic attitudes is, of course, that colonial strategies were not assigned randomly. For
example, because indirect colonialism tended to be conducted in pre-colonial states that were
more centralized (Gerring et al., 2011; Hariri, 2012), we usually cannot rule out that pre-state
centralization also affects political culture through channels beyond the form of colonial rule.
To address this endogeneity issue, this paper introduces a novel empirical design that exploits
a within-ethnic group natural experimental setting in the sub-Saharan country of Namibia. In
Namibia, as in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, colonial authorities instituted systems of direct
rule in those areas settled by white Europeans whereas, in those areas where indigenous popu-
lation was not dispossessed, colonial authorities ruled through a indirect system of local “tribal”
elites (Miescher, 2012). Unlike elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, however, Europeans did not
settle and directly rule only the most agriculturally fertile areas of Namibia (Werner and Oden-
daal, 2010) but rather settled in the more arid southern areas of Namibia which were hardest
hit by an 1897 rinderpest epidemic. In order to protect German herds from future epidemics, a
veterinary cordon fence was introduced at the spatial extent of direct German control in 1897
that divided northern and southern Namibia. In the face of stringent financial constraints, the
German colonists then never completely expanded their settlement territory to the northern
areas of the country (Eckl, 2007) but rather ruled indirectly through a system of appointed
traditional authorities.
Hence, whilst indirectly ruled areas of Namibia were governed through a system of appointed
traditional authorities, traditional authorities were given little or no political role in the directly
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ruled central and southern areas of Namibia. After Namibian independence in 1990, these
regional differences in the influence of traditional leaders still persist; traditional leaders play an
extremely important formal role in land allocation and customary law enforcement in northern
Namibia whilst playing a largely symbolic role in central and southern Namibia (Keulder, 2000).
Given that this colonial-era dividing line, progressively formalized throughout the 20th
century, was drawn with little reference to existing indigenous territorial boundaries, Namibia
provides an ideal setting to examine the effect of direct and indirect colonial rule on contemporary
democratic attitudes. We can identify the effect of forms of colonial rule on individual support for
democracy using the spatial discontinuity that exploits the exogenous border between formerly
indirect and directly ruled areas of Namibia with a spatial regression discontinuity design (RDD).
Our results suggest that that individuals in indirectly ruled areas are less likely to support
democracy as a system of governance, and less likely to participate in voting.
By analyzing individual-level survey data, we are able to provide evidence for the potential
mechanisms through which indirect and direct colonial rule affect contemporary political atti-
tudes. We find that people living in formerly indirectly ruled areas tend to contact traditional
leaders more and respect authority to a greater extent. This suggests that traditional leaders
still play an important role in the local governance in indirectly ruled areas and we theorize
that this is an important mechanism through which the form of colonial rule likely affects con-
temporary democratic attitudes. In this way, our findings advance a long-standing debate over
whether there is a trade-off between the consolidation of “traditional” and “modern” institutions
in sub-Saharan Africa (Mamdani, 1996; Englebert, 2000; Williams, 2004, 2010; Logan, 2008,
2009; Baldwin, 2015).
The paper is structured as follows: we first theorize how the form of colonial rule may affect
contemporary political attitudes and describe the historical background in Namibia. We then
discuss the data and the regression discontinuity design, which we apply to identify the effect
of indirect rule on individual support for democracy. Finally, we provide suggestive evidence
that exposure to the institution of traditional leadership is a key mechanism linking the form of
colonial rule with contemporary political attitudes.
2 Theory
How might the form of colonial rule affect contemporary political attitudes? Directly ruled
colonies such as Australia and Singapore can be defined as those that were administered by
imperial bureaucrats who enforced written laws, whereas indirectly ruled colonies such as Sierra
Leone or Nigeria were administered through local intermediaries such as chiefs or princes who
were given the authority to informally enforce customary or “traditional” law (Lange, 2004;
Acemoglu et al., 2014). Countries with denser pre-colonial populations, higher rates of settler
mortality and stronger pre-colonial states tended to experience indirect colonial rule (Acemoglu
et al., 2001; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2002; Gerring et al., 2011) and states that experienced
indirect rule tend to be less democratic today (Hariri, 2012). Hariri (2012) influentially argued
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that indirectly ruled countries are less democratic today because indirect colonial rule reinforced
traditional bonds of political authority and did not facilitate the transplantation of participatory
democratic institutions from Europe.
Yet, in sub-Saharan Africa indirect colonial rule did not only reinforce traditional bonds
of authority but often radically reshaped pre-colonial systems of governance to better suit the
administrative requirements of indirect rule. In extending their control over indirectly ruled
colonies, colonial authorities re-fashioned the existing political landscape by recognizing and
bolstering the coercive power of supportive elites, detaching the authority of traditional leaders
from the consent of local clansmen, and creating hierarchies of control with different salaried
ranks of “headmen” and “chiefs” where previously there existed only amorphous and territorially
dispersed clan-based loyalties (Newbury, 1988; Mamdani, 1996). Contemporary hierarchical
systems of traditional authority in indirectly ruled areas are therefore more accurately regarded
as legacies of authoritarian colonial political systems which radically altered indigenous African
forms of governance rather than as legacies of consolidated pre-colonial political systems.
The institutional legacies of indirect colonial rule have largely persisted to the current day
at a local level in sub-Saharan Africa, even as countries such as Namibia or Sierra Leone have
democratized at a national level. Traditional leaders1 or “tribal chiefs” were the key adminis-
trative stakeholders in indirectly ruled colonies and, barring a radical post-colonial upheaval in
local governance of the kind that occurred in Tanzania (Miguel, 2004), still today enjoy un-
paralleled political, social and economic authority in local governance in indirectly ruled areas
of sub-Saharan Africa (Düsing, 2002; De Kadt and Larreguy, 2014; Baldwin, 2014; Acemoglu
et al., 2014). As highlighted by many African scholars and political leaders (e.g. Mboya 1956;
Luthuli 1962; Ntsebeza 2005; Meer and Campbell 2007), the institution of traditional leadership
is incongruous with democratic notions of rule of law, the primacy of individual over group
rights, and electoral accountability of authority; indeed, Mahmood Mamdani goes so far as to
call traditional leadership a system of “decentralized despotism” (Mamdani, 1996).
The existence of an undemocratic2 parallel governance system at the local level has im-
portant implications for the development of different kinds of political culture in directly and
indirectly ruled areas of sub-Saharan Africa. Political attitudes are endogenous to exposure to
forms of governance. Individuals who live under democracies are more likely to become social-
ized to accept democratic notions of electoral legitimacy whereas individuals who live under
autocracies are more likely to become socialized to accept non-democratic bases for legitimacy
- hence, support for electoral democracy has been shown to increase the longer that individuals
live under a democratic government (Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2015; de Aquino, 2015).
1We do not mean to imply an endorsement of claims to traditional notions of legitimacy when using the
term traditional leader. Rather, we follow Baldwin (2015) by defining traditional leaders with reference to
contemporary customs i.e. as “rulers” who have power by virtue of their association with the customary mode
of governing a place-based community” (p.21).
2In using the term “undemocratic” to describe traditional leadership we are only referring to its lack of procedural
democracy and make no claim about the substantive democratic qualities of traditional leaders, which may
exceed those of elected political leaders (Baldwin, 2015).
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In sub-Saharan Africa, traditional leaders are often the most widely supported and trusted polit-
ical actors in society and have an independent, non-electoral base of political legitimacy (Logan,
2008)3. We expect that, because the institution of traditional leadership is a hierarchical form
of governance, individuals in indirectly ruled areas have been socialized to be less willing to
question authority in general. We also expect that ongoing exposure to the institution of tra-
ditional leadership in indirectly ruled areas of sub-Saharan Africa has socialized individuals to
accept non-democratic systems of government even as national political leaders are increasingly
democratically elected. Finally, given that voting is the essential participatory exercise in a
democracy and civic norms of participation have been shown to be crucial in motivating in-
dividuals to sustain the cost of voting in Southern Africa (e.g. De Kadt 2017; Roberts et al.
2014), we expect weaker civic norms of electoral participation to be reflected in lower turnout
in indirectly ruled areas.
In articulating and testing whether the institutional legacies of indirect colonial rule un-
dermine contemporary democratic consolidation, we consciously enter into a long-standing and
rich debate in the literature on sub-Saharan African politics. A number of authors have previ-
ously and compellingly argued that the ongoing political influence of traditional authorities in
the post-colony presents a significant block to democratic consolidation (Mamdani, 1996; En-
glebert, 2000; Ntsebeza, 2005; Ribot, 2001). Mamdani (1996) and Englebert (2000) were both
particularly influential in arguing that African states and democratic leaders have been engaged
a struggle with local traditional leaders over bases of power and political legitimacy amongst
subject populations in the post-colonial context.
On the other hand, a number of other authors have since argued that there is no necessary
trade-off between traditional leadership and democratic consolidation because good governance is
key to the legitimation of both elected and unelected officials in Africa alike (Bratton et al., 2005).
As local political actors may be kept accountable and good governance achieved through both
electoral and non-electoral means (Baldwin, 2015), there may be no necessary trade-off between
support for traditional leadership and elected leadership (Williams, 2004, 2010). Rather, insofar
as good governance requires co-operation between traditional authorities and elected officials, it
may be that legitimacy is a a rising tide that lifts all boats (Logan, 2013)4. We help adjudicate
between these competing perspectives by exploiting exogenous variation in the form of colonial
rule - something that is essential to conduct causal inference given that the institutional influence
of traditional leadership across different ethnic groups is far from assigned randomly.
Specifically, and following on from the above theoretical framework, we will test the following
two key hypotheses:
H1: Individuals in indirectly ruled areas are less likely to support democracy as a system
3Logan (2008) explores a number of reasons for this authority including the greater symbolic resonance, re-
sponsiveness, proximity to and overall effectiveness of traditional leaders at performing governing functions
in their communities compared to elected officials.
4Such an argument has recently received support from Logan (2008, 2013) who has used cross-national individual
survey data to illustrate that greater trust and support for traditional authorities does not negatively correlate
with support for core democratic tenets.
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of government
H2: Individuals in indirectly ruled areas are less likely to turnout at elections
Our theoretical framework moreover predicts that this relationship is likely being driven
by greater contact to traditional leaders and greater respect for authorities in indirectly ruled
areas. Thus, whilst we primarily focus on support for democracy as our outcome of interest, we
will also test the following secondary hypotheses:
H3: Individuals in indirectly ruled areas are more likely to contact traditional authorities
H4: Individuals in indirectly ruled areas are less likely to support questioning authority
3 Historical background
Namibia, or South-West Africa as it was formerly known, was colonized progressively by Ger-
many over the second half of the nineteenth century in the well-known “Scramble for Africa”.
Prior to colonization, the dominant ethnic groups in Namibia were Ovambo (Ambo), Herero,
Nama (Heikum), Bushmen (Kung) and Damara (Bergdama) (see Figure 3 in the Appendix).
They had qualitatively similar political structures as measured by traditional form of succession
of the local headman (patrilineal heirs) and none of these groups had individual property rights.
However the means of subsistence differed. While the Ovambos depended on agricultural farm-
ing, Herero and Nama depended on animal husbandry and Bushmen and Damara on gathering
and hunting5.
When Namibia became a German protectorate in
Figure 1: Map of 1907
1884, German settlements initially focused on the less
densely populated southern and central coastal regions of
Namibia which they reached first and where land could
be more easily acquired (Zimmerer, 2001). German colo-
nial authorities then gradually expanded their territorial
remit from the coast by playing off warring local factions
and remunerating a number of indigenous elites in cen-
tral Namibia for lost landholdings (German Colonial Of-
fice, 1919; Ofcansky, 1981). The Germans had planned
on progressively conquering the wealthier northern part
of the protectorate but in 1897, a critical event occurred
that was to shape the spatial incidence of direct and in-
direct rule: a rinderpest epidemic killed 95 percent of the
cattle herds in central and southern Namibia. The epi-
demic particularly devastated cattle-dependent indigenous communities in central and southern
Namibia because, unlike agricultural communities in fertile northern Namibia, the arid nature
of the land prevented agriculture from being used as a feasible food-source substitute (Miescher,
2012; Eckl, 2007). The rinderpest epidemic thereby provided a key opportunity for German
colonists to acquire large tracts of land in central and southern Namibia relatively cheaply with
5Information on local headmen taken from v72, data on property rights from variables v74 and v75 and infor-
mation on economic structures from variables v1-v5 in (Murdock, 1967).
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lessened collective resistance from weakened indigenous communities.
However, the epidemic also presented a dilemma to colonizers - there was little prospect of
quickly extending direct German rule to the relatively unaffected northern areas of South-West
Africa, yet continuing to allow free animal movement across South-West Africa would be to
potentially expose German herds to future devastating epidemics. Shortly after the epidemic
in 1897, therefore, the German colonial government set up a veterinary cordon fence at the
boundaries of where at the time its direct control extended in order to protect southern and
central cattle herds from future potentially rinderpest-infected animals from the north (Miescher,
2012).
Irked by the rising cost of police protection of settlers in South-West Africa, in December
1905 the Reichstag in Berlin passed a resolution stating that police protection in the colonies
“should be restricted to the smallest possible area focusing on those regions where our economic
interests tend to coalesce”.6 The veterinary cordon fence in effect then became a Police Zone
boundary (see figure 1) and formed the dividing line between “white” and “black” Namibia –
the area directly settled and directly ruled by German authorities, and the area indirectly ruled
through a system of indigenous elites.7 Trade and the permanent movement of people between
these two parts of South-West Africa was restricted by the German authorities and indigenous
political structures within the Police Zone were destroyed.
After the South Africans began to administer South-West Africa after World War I, the
South Africans began to try to establish more regular administrative structures through which
to indirectly rule the areas north of the veterinary cordon fence. Yet, the often amorphous and
territorially fluid indigenous political structures did not provide the tribal ordering colonial offi-
cials had been conditioned to expect, and initial attempts to try and co-opt the paramount chief
of areas such as Kaokoland were met with puzzling failure; no clear hierarchical political order
could be found (Bennett, 1998). In response, in 1927 the South Africans formally appropriated
the power to create and dissolve “tribes" and set about appointing persons as chief or headman
of rough territorial lands. As Friedman (2006) points out, the bases of consequent appointments
to traditional leadership in South-West Africa were often contradictory - the government recog-
nized particular persons as traditional leaders “because they were looked upon as such by the
people, that is, because their authority was derived ‘traditionally’. On the other hand, many
leaders were often officially warned, for example, that unless they carry out instructions issued
to them by officials of the Administration and do everything possible to assist these officials in
future, the Administration...will be forced to consider whether they should not be deprived of
their status” (Friedman 2006, pp.29-30). Provided they complied with the colonial administra-
tion, appointed traditional leaders were allowed untrammelled political authority over subject
6Resolution des Deutschen Reichstags vom 15. Dezember 1905 (NAN-ZBU-L II A 5 vol. 1), see Miescher (2012),
p.44.
7“The activities of the administration were concentrated in the southern and central regions of the protectorate,
the so-called Police Zone”. In the German original: “Die Taetigkeit der Verwaltung beschraenkte sich auf das
Zentrum und den Sueden des Schutzgebietes, die sogenannte “Polizeizone”, waehrend der noerdliche Teil von
der deutschen Verwaltung vorlaufig ausgenommen war.” (Zimmerer, 2001, p. 114)
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populations, including the power to administer communal land and settle disputes (Keulder,
2000).
The spatial division was later formalized by the South African authorities through the
Odendaal Commission of 1964 which created a number of racially demarcated “Homelands”
in northern Namibia to be administered by officially recognized “tribal chiefs”. According to
Miescher (2012), the Odendaal commission’s decision to construct a visible physical border that
was regularly patrolled meant that “the intra-Namibian border was more impermeable than ever”
(Miescher, 2012, p.173). While the north was ruled by traditional authorities, the indigenous
population in the south was exploited by the German and later South African colonizers through
a system of temporary contract labor on white-owned farms and factories (Odendaal, 1964;
Moorsom, 1977; Melber, 1996). Under effective apartheid, rule of law and electoral suffrage only
extended to the white population and the vast bulk of laborers were returned to their racial
“homelan” after one or two years working in the south.
Reflecting the experience of other colonies, a within-country “reversal of fortune” (Acemoglu
et al., 2002) gradually occurred in Namibia whereby extractive colonial institutions were set up in
the relatively densely populated areas of northern Namibia, which were the poorest in the country
at the time of independence in 1990 (Namibia Statistics Agency, 2011). After independence
from South Africa, Namibia successfully transitioned to multi-party democracy and it has been
governed continuously since 1990 by the liberation party SWAPO. National and regional political
structures across the country have been homogenized but the local institutional influence of tribal
leaders in the north persists to the present day. Traditional authorities have proven extremely
active and successful in mobilizing to protect colonial-era institutional privileges (Düsing, 2002)
and so traditional authorities are still very important in administering communal land and
enforcing customary law. Moreover, individuals in the north are extremely supportive of their
traditional authorities (Keulder, 2000).
On the other hand, Namibians living in the former Police Zone have only experienced a
democratic governance system since independence in 1990 at all levels of government. The
Namibia government under SWAPO invested heavily in the northern regions after independence
in order to support the convergence of living standards in the two parts of the country (De-
velopment Expenditure Report by National Planning Commission Namibia). The Namibian
Household Income and Expenditure Survey (NHIES), which was first conducted in 1993, docu-
ments this convergence process in its 2010 report by showing that differences in terms of poverty
rates between northern and southern regions have declined since independence.
4 Data and Empirical Strategy
We identify the effect of indirect colonial rule on democratic attitudes and behavior by using the
exogenous location of the Police Zone boundary in Namibia and applying a spatial regression
discontinuity design analogous to Dell (2010). The northern part of the border between directly
and indirectly ruled territories was shaped by the spatial extent of direct German control at
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the end of the rinderpest epidemic of 1897. The border zone where the progressive extension of
direct German rule was frozen in 1905 can thus be considered exogenous to pre-colonial political
attitudes8.
We use the original map published by the Odendaal Commission in 1964 as digitized by
Mendelsohn (2002) to identify regions directly controlled by the colonizers and those that were
governed by traditional authorities during colonial times. To minimize potential endogeneity, we
only focus on the northern part of the former Police Zone boundary as this part still represented
the original boundary drawn by the Germans when the Odendaal Commission of 1964 formalized
the border. Other parts of the border were changed over time9. We then created a 100km buffer
zone around the plausibly exogenous boundary between these two zones (see figure 2) and only
focus on observations within this buffer to ensure comparability10. We chose a 100km buffer
because individuals living in this zone live in similar geographic, political and cultural environ-
ments. There is a tradeoff between comparing individuals living in very similar environments
(as close to each other as possible) and still having enough observations for our analysis. Based
on power calculations we then decided to use a 100km buffer, which provides us with enough
observations to identify our effects of interests. While the 100km is our preferred buffer size
we also include estimations using observations from the entire country and observations from a
50km buffer zone as robustness checks.
The outcome variables of interest used in this paper stem from the Afrobarometer survey.
Between 1999 and 2008, four survey rounds (1999, 2003, 2005, 2008) were conducted, which
covered questions about attitudes towards politics, the economy and civil society11. We limit
our analysis to the indigenous population in both the formerly directly and indirectly ruled
areas and therefore exclude whites from the sample. Afrobarometer uses random sampling
methods, which are conducted with probability proportionate to population size (i.e. more
densely populated areas have a higher probability of being sampled). Thus, “the sample design
is a clustered, stratified, multi-stage, area probability sample” (Afrobarometer.org).
The relevant question about “demand for democracy” (Bratton, 2004; de Aquino, 2015),
our main outcome variable, asks about support for democracy (see Appendix for original ques-
tions). The main behavioral outcome that we focus on is voter turnout. We measure individual
turnout using a question asking whether the individual voted in the most recent national elec-
tion12. Finally, to test our hypothesis that different attitudes towards authority and contact
8“The Police Zone border was determined in Berlin, its location resulted from geographical considerations,
previous colonial experiences in boundary-drawing, and arbitrary decisions disconnected from actual on-site
conditions. In the north the Police Zone boundary generally followed the course of the former cordon line.”
(Miescher, 2001, p.47)
9In 1947 the Police Zone was enlarged in the west and in the east based on recommendations from the Lardner-
Burke Commission. The northern part - near Kaoko, Owambo, and Kavango - however remained unchanged
(Miescher, 2012, p.143).
10We excluded Etosha National Park from the buffer area.
11We do not use the two most recent survey rounds because they do not ask detailed questions about our
outcomes of interest.
12We rely on self-reported data because official turnout data is not available at the EA level. This level of
disaggregation is necessary in order to clearly identify whether people live in the directly or indirectly ruled
9
with traditional leaders are important mechanisms for the development of different attitudes
towards democracy, we analyze responses to (i) a question about the frequency of contact with
traditional leaders and (ii) a question which asked whether authorities should be respected or
whether one should be allowed to question them in general (see exact wording of the questions
in the Appendix).
The geographical location of the surveyed individuals is identified by enumeration area.
The Namibian Statistics Agency divided Namibia into 4080 enumeration areas for the 2001
census (see figure 2), each comprises between 80 and 100 households. Therefore, there are
more enumeration areas in more densely populated regions. The number of enumeration areas
within the 100km buffer zone is 1247. Out of these 1247 enumeration areas, the Afrobarometer
survey covered between 42 and 47 in in each round. This constitutes a random sample of all
enumeration areas in the buffer zone. There are more enumeration areas in the northern part
of the buffer as this part is more densely populated than the southern part. We observe eight
individuals per enumeration area in each survey round. This gives us a maximum number of
1426 observations for the 100km buffer. This number of observations however differs between
specifications as not each question is asked in every survey round and we eliminated observations
where the responded answered “don’t know”.
Pre-colonial political structures and attitudes were ethnic-group specific. The Police Zone
border cuts through the pre-colonial territories of five different ethnic groups (Ovambo, Kavango,
Nama/Damara, Herero and Caprivi). The Murdock (1967) data suggests that pre-colonial modes
of subsistence differed between these communities, which may in turn have affected the polit-
ical structures and thereby political attitudes. We therefore include ethnic fixed effects in all
specifications so as only to compare individuals from the same ethnic group and thereby ensure
that pre-treatment attitudes did not differ between the direct and indirectly ruled areas. We use
self-reported ethnicity data from Afrobarometer and all ethnic groups are represented in both
parts of the buffer.
Survey round fixed effects are included in order to account for the different timing of the
Afrobarometer survey rounds. The border also cuts through seven (out of fourteen) adminis-
trative regions13 so that we can compare individuals who face the same regional institutions
with each other by including region fixed effects. This is important in order to account for
differential institutional performance, which is an important predictor of support for democ-
racy (Bratton et al., 2005). Whilst Namibia is highly centralized politically, elected regional
councillors nevertheless play an important role in lobbying for and allocating central funds.
There are no significant differences in terms of income, education, gender and age between
individuals in the northern and southern part of the buffer zone (see Table 1). We nevertheless
add individual-level controls to all specifications as they are also important determinants of
political attitudes (Bratton et al., 2005) and help us to identify the effects more precisely. We
use a Afrobarometer question about how often an individual has gone without food over the
part of the country.
13The border cuts through Kavango, Kunene, Ohangwena, Omusati, Oshana, Oshikoto, Otjozondjupa
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past year as proxy for income and a question about the highest level of education and about
age as measures for education and age respectively (see exact wording of the questions in the
Appendix). For detailed summary statistics of the variables of interests see Table 11 in the
Appendix.
Table 1: Balancing table for the buffer zone
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Without food Education Gender Age
Indirect colonial rule 0.0398 -0.274 0.0232 1.606
(0.163) (0.193) (0.0306) (1.043)
Observations 1,417 1,406 1,060 1,413
Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes
Survey round FE yes yes yes yes
Mean of DV 1.140 3.814 0.490 35.82
Results from OLS regressions. The sample consists of observations from the 100km
buffer zone. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In our baseline specification we include distance to Windhoek (in decimal degrees) as a
control variable because it is likely to capture variation in observables and unobservables that
affect political attitudes such as trade or information penetration. It thus ensures that we are
not only picking up a linear trend in terms of proximity to the capital.
For robustness and to help rule out alternative mechanisms we also include specifications
with the following controls: subjective evaluation of the performance of local government coun-
cilors, livestock suitability and a urban/rural dummy. Bratton et al. (2005) found that the most
important predictor of support for democracy in sub-Saharan Africa is the performance of the
government. We therefore control for the performance of local governance councils measured
with the respective Afrobarometer question (see Appendix) to ensure that our estimated effects
are not driven by differences in institutional quality at the local level. We include livestock
suitability14 as further proxy for economic well-being in each of the predominantly rural com-
munities, which rely on cattle rearing as an important source of income (Mendelsohn, 2002).
Moreover, it helps to eliminate concerns about pre-colonial differences in pastoral and agricul-
tural suitability, which may in turn have affected the political processes of different communities
within the same ethnic group.
14Livestock suitability is measured as “maximum biomass of livestock that can be supported on a long-term,
sustainable basis by the available grazing” in kg/hectare (Mendelsohn,2002, p. 150). We assume that these
geographic conditions are constant over time and therefore use a ten-year average (1995-2005) of the variable.
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Figure 2: Enumeration areas and buffer
We are aware that some of these control variables may be “bad controls” and thereby lead
to post-treatment control bias (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). The perceived performance of local
government officials, urbanization as well as income are potential outcomes of our treatment.
We therefore also present specifications without these controls.
Our baseline specification includes ethnicity and survey round fixed effects because these
are both crucial requirements for our identification strategy. Moreover, we include distance to
Windhoek as control for effects of the geographic location, regional fixed effects as further ge-
ographic control but also control for institutional quality and finally individual- level controls
(age, income and education), which are major determinants of political attitudes. These specifi-
cations are spatial regression discontinuity designs, as discussed in Dell (2010), with distance to
Windhoek as running variable because distance to the capital is the politically and economically
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most relevant geographic dimension in our context. In addition, we present specifications, which
control flexibly for geographic location15.
The baseline RDD estimation equation is thus:
Yidres = β0 + β1Indirectruled + X
′
idesΓ+ ηe + µs + ψr + ǫidres
Y expresses demand for democracy of individual i, living in enumeration area d in region r,
belonging to the ethnic group e, being surveyed in round s. Indirectrule is a dummy variable
indicating whether the individual lives in an enumeration area which belonged to the indirectly
or the directly ruled part of Namibia. X is a set of control variables, which includes individual-
level characteristics such as age and dummies for income and education16 as well as distance
to Windhoek. ηe are ethnicity fixed effects, µs are survey-round fixed effects and ψr are region
fixed effects.
We identify the effect of indirect colonial rule on democratic attitudes by OLS estimation
and also show specifications using (ordered) probit estimations because our outcome variables
are discrete.
5 Results
Living in the formerly indirectly ruled part of Namibia decreases the probability that people
think that a democratic government is preferable to any other type of government and decreases
the probability of voting (Table 2). Columns (1) and (4) present raw comparisons of political
attitudes and behavior between indirectly and directly ruled areas. These specifications include
only ethnicity and survey round fixed effects, which are minimally required to draw causal
inference in our context. Columns (2) and (5) present our preferred RDD specification including
also region fixed effects, individual level controls and distance to Windhoek. Columns (3) and
(6) show that the effects are also statistically significant when applying a (ordered) probit model
because the dependent variables are discrete. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the
size of the coefficients we will focus on the linear probability model rather than on the probit
estimations.
The magnitude of the effect on democratic attitudes is in the range of a fourth of a standard
deviation of the dependent variable (i.e. living in the formerly indirectly ruled areas decreases
support for democracy by 0.2 on a scale from 1 to 3). The coefficient increases in magnitude
when adding distance to Windhoek, regional fixed effects and individual level controls. Moreover,
people in the indirectly ruled part of the buffer report that they vote significantly less (10-20%)
than people living in the directly ruled part. This indicates that weaker democratic attitudes are
associated with less reported voting - the essential political act in a democracy - and thus that
indirect colonial rule indeed presents a block to democratic consolidation both in an attitudinal
15Second order polynomials of distance distance to Windhoek and to the Police Zone boundary as well as local












and behavioral sense. These results provide confirmatory evidence for H1 and H2: people living
in formerly indirectly ruled areas indeed support democracy less as a system of government and
turnout less strongly at elections.
Table 2: Effect of indirect rule on support for democracy and voting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Support Support Support Voting Voting Voting
democracy democracy democracy
VARIABLES OLS OLS O Probit OLS OLS Probit
Indirect colonial rule -0.178** -0.223* -0.357* -0.122*** -0.166** -0.590*
(0.0746) (0.133) (0.198) (0.0409) (0.0824) (0.305)
Distance to Windhoek -0.0228 -0.0142 -0.0389 -0.0919
(0.0790) (0.118) (0.0574) (0.223)
Observations 1,347 1,329 1,329 734 723 721
R2 0.019 0.043 0.049 0.287
Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Survey round FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region FE no yes yes no yes yes
Individual-level controls no yes yes no yes yes
# clusters 165 165 165 91 91 91
Mean of DV 2.399 2.401 2.401 0.722 0.719 0.718
Results from OLS regressions. Individual-level control variables are age, education dummies and income dummies.
The sample consists of observations from the 100km buffer zone. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area)
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3 presents evidence on potential mechanisms linking indirect colonial rule and con-
temporary political attitudes as outlined in the theory section. We theorized that contact to
traditional authorities is an important mechanism for persistence in the effects of indirect colo-
nial rule on contemporary democratic consolidation in sub-Saharan Africa. Our results (Table
3, columns 1-3) confirm H3 as contact to traditional leaders increases by around 0.4 points
(on a scale of 0-3) if an individual lives in an indirectly ruled area of Namibia rather than in a
directly ruled area. We also theorized that living under a hierarchical local governance system
in indirectly ruled areas has socialized individuals into having greater respect for authority. The
results in columns (4), (5) and (6) provide suggestive evidence in favor of H4 as the evidence
indicates that people in the north do tend to respect authorities more. Whilst the direction of
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the effect is stable the statistical significance of the coefficient on indirect rule does, however,
vary across specifications.
Table 3: Effect of indirect rule on support for democracy, voting and contact with traditional
leaders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contact Contact Contact Respect Respect Respect
TL TL TL authority authority authority
VARIABLES OLS OLS O Probit OLS OLS O Probit
Indirect colonial rule 0.391*** 0.408* 0.714* 0.125 0.347* 0.422*
(0.104) (0.236) (0.395) (0.0867) (0.203) (0.239)
Distance to Windhoek -0.0488 -0.0624 -0.134 -0.170
(0.137) (0.207) (0.126) (0.146)
Observations 1,418 1,400 1,400 1,365 1,009 1,009
R2 0.142 0.183 0.121 0.195
Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Survey round FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region FE no yes yes no yes yes
Individual-level controls no yes yes no yes yes
# clusters 165 165 165 165 123 123
Mean of DV 0.695 0.699 0.699 2.431 2.458 2.458
Results from OLS regressions. Individual-level control variables are age, education dummies and income dum-
mies. The sample consists of observations from the 100km buffer zone. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration
Area) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
5.1 Alternative RD polynomials
This section shows that the effect of indirect colonial rule on contemporary political attitudes
holds when controlling for the geographic location of the individuals in a flexible manner. We
first control for a local linear polynomial in longitude and latitude as suggested by Gelman
and Imbens (2014), which allows us to take the multidimensionality of the discontinuity into
account (Dell, 2010; Dell et al., 2015). In the context of a regression discontinuity design, the
local linear polynomial in longitude and latitude can be interpreted as the running variable,
which controls for smooth functions of geographic location. We also present specifications with
a one-dimensional running variable (distance to Windhoek as in the baseline and distance to the
Police Zone boundary17). In order to control for these one-dimensional measures more flexibly
17In these specifications we also add regional fixed effects to better account for the exact geographic location of
the individuals.
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we include second order polynomials.
Table 4 shows that the negative effect of indirect colonial rule on turnout and support
for democracy is largely robust across different spatial regression discontinuity specifications.
Table 12 in the Appendix shows the respective results for the outcomes contact with traditional
leaders and respect for authority. Whilst the positive effect of indirect colonial rule on contact to
traditional leaders is robust across different spatial regression discontinuity specifications, this
is not the case for respect for authorities. Hence, there is strong evidence in favor of hypotheses
H1, H2 and H3 but only suggestive evidence in favor of H4.
Table 4: Different specifications of RD polynomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Support Support Support Voting Voting Voting
VARIABLES democracy democracy democracy
Indirect colonial rule -0.208* -0.246* -0.259*** -0.192** -0.127 -0.216***
(0.111) (0.127) (0.0956) (0.0952) (0.0815) (0.0496)
Observations 1,347 1,347 1,347 734 734 734
R2 0.022 0.029 0.029 0.052 0.063 0.060
Lat/Lon yes no no yes no no
Dist. Windhoek quadr no yes no no yes no
Dist. Boundary quadr no no yes no no yes
Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Survey round FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
# clusters 165 165 165 91 91 91
Mean of DV 2.399 2.399 2.399 0.722 0.722 0.722
Results from OLS regressions. Columns (1), and (4) include a local linear polynomials in Longitude and Latitude.
Columns (2), and (5) include a quadratic polynomial in distance to Windhoek. Columns (3), and (6) include a
quadratic polynomial in distance to the boundary. The sample consists of observations from the 100km buffer zone.
Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
5.2 Robustness checks
To test the robustness of our results to the inclusion of more controls, we also included perfor-
mance of the government, livestock suitability and an urban/rural dummy as control variables
because these factors may bias the estimated coefficients (see Tables 5 and 6). The size of the
effect of indirect colonial rule on support for democracy is -0.32 when adding all controls at
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the same time (Column 5). That corresponds to around a third of a standard deviation of the
dependent variable. It is however much larger than the baseline effect (Column 1), which may
be caused by bad controls, which are outcomes of the treatment themselves. The effect sizes in
this tables should therefore be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, the results confirm that
there is still a significant negative effect of indirect rule on support for democracy even when
taking potential confounders into account. The effect of indirect rule on voting also remains
statistically significant negative throughout all specifications (Table 6). The effect size is also
substantially larger when compared to the baseline estimates and should be interpreted with
caution.
Table 5: Effect of indirect rule on support for democracy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Support Support Support Support Support
VARIABLES democracy democracy democracy democracy democracy
Indirect colonial rule -0.223* -0.313** -0.237* -0.222* -0.320**
(0.133) (0.141) (0.135) (0.126) (0.147)
Distance to Windhoek -0.0228 0.00163 -0.0212 -0.0185 0.00273
(0.0790) (0.0821) (0.0792) (0.0761) (0.0830)
Performance government -0.00667 -0.00652
(0.0288) (0.0289)




Observations 1,329 1,274 1,329 1,334 1,274
R2 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.046 0.044
Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes yes
Survey round FE yes yes yes yes yes
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes
Individual-level controls yes yes yes yes yes
# clusters 165 165 165 165 165
Mean of DV 2.401 2.399 2.401 2.397 2.399
Results from OLS regressions. Individual-level control variables are age, education dummies and income
dummies. The sample consists of observations from the 100km buffer zone. Standard errors (clustered by
Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Effect of indirect colonial rule on voting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Voting Voting Voting Voting Voting
Indirect colonial rule -0.166** -0.212** -0.173* -0.181* -0.224**
(0.0824) (0.0872) (0.0888) (0.0920) (0.0970)
Distance to Windhoek -0.0389 -0.00556 -0.0371 -0.0367 -0.00636
(0.0574) (0.0564) (0.0592) (0.0586) (0.0572)
Performance government 0.0137 0.0125
(0.0223) (0.0226)




Observations 723 687 723 723 687
R2 0.287 0.285 0.287 0.287 0.286
Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes yes
Survey round FE yes yes yes yes yes
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes
Individual-level controls yes yes yes yes yes
# clusters 91 91 91 91 91
Mean of DV 0.719 0.721 0.719 0.719 0.721
Results from OLS regressions. Individual-level control variables are age, education dummies
and income dummies. The sample consists of observations from the 100km buffer zone. Stan-
dard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The results for support for democracy also hold when not only focusing on observations
in the 100km buffer zone but using a sample from the entire country and also when using a
50km buffer zone (see Appendix Table 13). The results for voting are less robust to changing
the buffer size. The sample size reduces to 390 when restricting the sample to the 50km buffer
and therefore there is likely not enough variation left to estimate the effect on voting precisely
given that we include a number of fixed effects and control variables.
In addition we created placebo buffers by shifting the location of the former Police Zone
boundary one degree latitude north and south respectively. When running these regressions we
do not find any significant effects on support for democracy or voting (Tables 15 and 16), which
confirms that our results are unique to this historical meaningful Police Zone boundary.
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As an additional robustness check we clustered the standard errors on a constituency level,
which reduces the number of clusters from 165 to 40 (see Appendix table 17). The main results
still hold.
6 Alternative explanations
Whilst as in all historically oriented work we cannot rule out all other alternative explanations
for the mechanisms that bring about the effect of indirect colonial rule on contemporary political
attitudes, we here address the most likely potential confounders including political socialization,
sorting, contemporary institutional quality, income and education.
6.1 Political socialization
Political socialization over one’s lifetime is of course an important determinant of future political
attitudes and different colonial experiences in the north and south may have led to different
attitudes toward democracy. Importantly, however, the indigenous population of Namibia did
not experience democracy in either the direct or indirectly ruled areas of Namibia during colonial
times. Whereas northern Namibia was ruled by authoritarian traditional authorities and, to a
lesser extent by the colonial administration, the indigenous population in southern and central
Namibia was exploited by the German and later South African colonizers through a system of
contract labor (Moorsom, 1977; Melber, 1996; Odendaal, 1964). The “rule of law” and electoral
democracy only applied to the white population. Different lengths of participation in democracy
thus does not represent a confounder between the north and the south.
It could be on the other hand that the introduction of democracy was seen as a greater
“liberation” in the south relative to the north. To test this argument, we see whether the effect
of indirect colonial rule differs for individuals who experienced liberation and those who did
not. Table 19 (in the Appendix) demonstrates that there is no interaction effect between age
and living in the formerly indirectly ruled areas. That means that the effect of living in the
north on democratic attitudes does not differ between young and old people. If different political
socialization or the experience of liberation is an important confounder then the effect of living
in the north should be much stronger for older people, who experienced the different political
socialization between indirectly and directly ruled areas much longer. These results also hold
when using a binary age measure18 (see Table 19 in Appendix).
6.2 Sorting
During the German rule, permanent migration between the two parts of the country was pro-
hibited. After taking control of Namibia after 1914, the South Africans established a migrant
labor system that brought workers from the north to work in the south in order to satisfy white
18Dividing the sample into those younger than the median age (31 years) and those older than median age.
Those younger than median age experienced the most part of their political socialization after 1990.
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farmers’ demand for cheap farmhand labor. These laborers were required to return to their racial
homeland after a period of 18-24 months and re-apply for the temporary labor scheme, and so
there was no permanent sorting. We cannot entirely rule out the effect of selective sorting after
independence in 1990, however we believe this is unlikely to act as an important confounder. In
northern areas of Namibia, land is communally held and ties to one’s family, one’s community
and to ancestral land rights are extremely close (Paul, 1933; Eirola, 1992)19. Moreover, mi-
gration statistics from the Namibian Statistics Agency suggest that permanent migration from
the north, where it has occurred, has been economic in nature as the young have moved to
the larger cities of the south such as Windhoek or Walvis Bay far south of our study area to
look for jobs. To control for the factors that might affect individual propensity to migrate, we
control for age and education in our specifications - neither of which changes the results. Hence,
though it cannot be completely ruled out, it is unlikely that selective sorting explains our results
(Moorsom, 1977; Melber, 1996).
6.3 Contemporary institutions
Other than the greater importance of traditional leaders in northern Namibia, contemporary
institutions do not differ between the northern and southern areas in our sample. In order to
ensure that our effects are not different by differing performance of local government officials as
theorized by Williams (2010) and Logan (2013), we have previously included controls for the
individuals’ evaluation of the performance of local government councils which do not actually
appear to have a significant effect on democratic attitudes. Moreover, Namibia is extremely
centralized politically because, after independence, the Namibian government made a great ef-
fort to homogenize governance between the two parts of the country and improve institutional
infrastructure and efficiency in the previously neglected north where state capacity was previ-
ously low (Werner and Odendaal, 2010; Melber, 2015; Düsing, 2002; Keulder, 2000). Finally,
we can use Afrobarometer data to show that people living north and south of the border do
not systematically evaluate the effectiveness of government institutions differently in a way that
would bias towards our hypothesis (see Table 5).
19“Both home-sickness and social and family ties made almost all the workers come back” (Eirola,1992, p.214)
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Table 7: Balancing Table
(1) (2) (3)
Direct rule Indirect rule Difference
Government officials listen 1.22 1.26 -0.048
[1.06] [1.08] (0.11)
Trust in police 1.78 1.91 -0.13*
[0.85] [0.88] (0.070)
Trust in courts 1.83 1.91 -0.085
[0.92] [0.95] (0.067)
Fear of unjust arrest 3.93 3.83 0.097
[0.73] [0.93] (0.091)
Observations 253 1,163 1,416
Individuals on both sides of the border think that governmental officials listen sometimes to
what the people say. The coefficient on fear of unjust arrest, which is an indicator for despotism
of officials, does also not differ significantly between formerly directly ruled and indirectly ruled
areas of Namibia. As further measures of the reliability of contemporary institutions we use
trust in courts and police. Trust in courts does not differ between the two parts. Trust in police
is even significantly higher in the north, which would bias against finding an negative effect of
indirect colonial rule on support for democracy.
Moreover, we include fixed effects for the seven regions that the settlement boundary cuts
through in our baseline specification. This ensures that we only compare individuals living close
to each other on the same part of the boundary, who are governed by the same national and
regional institutions nowadays.
6.4 Income
Income differed substantially between areas within and outside the Police Zone during colonial
times. After independence however the government introduced policies to reduce the large
income disparities between the north and the south. The effect of indirect rule on income should
therefore not be highly persistent. We compare only people living close to each other, so that
potential income gaps should have closed after independence. Table 8 demonstrates that indirect
colonial rule does not have a statistically significant impact on income and thus suggests that
the effect of indirect rule on income is not persistent in the buffer zone. Moreover, including
dummies for different income groups in our specifications does not change our results.
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Table 8: Indirect colonial rule and income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS Ordered Probit
Indirect colonial rule -0.204 0.0398 -0.0551 0.226 0.279
(0.134) (0.163) (0.210) (0.286) (0.227)
Distance to Windhoek -0.235 -0.165
(0.175) (0.111)
Observations 1,417 1,417 1,400 1,400 1,400
R2 0.004 0.055 0.133 0.136
Ethnicity FE no yes yes yes yes
Survey round FE no yes yes yes yes
Region FE no no yes yes yes
Individual-level controls no no yes yes yes
Mean of DV 1.140 1.140 1.132 1.132 1.132
Results from OLS regressions. Control variables are age and education dummies. The sample
consists of observations from the 100km buffer zone. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration
Area) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
6.5 Education
Education does not differ between the northern and southern part of the buffer among the in-
digenous Namibian population. This is because missionaries founded schools long before the first
colonizers reached Namibia. Even during colonial times, missionaries were as active at providing
education for indigenous Namibians in the south as in the north and the Namibian government
after 1990 has not favored the north or south disproportionately in terms of education. Table
9 shows statistically that areas formerly under indirect rule do not have significantly lower lev-
els of education. Hence, as education does not differ between the directly and indirectly ruled
areas of Namibia, it can be ruled out as a likely channel though which indirect colonial rule
affects political attitudes. In any case, including dummies for individual level of education in
our specifications does not change the results.
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Table 9: Indirect colonial rule and contemporary education levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS Ordered Probit
Indirect colonial rule 0.0147 -0.274 -0.294 -0.128 -0.0870
(0.189) (0.193) (0.232) (0.296) (0.176)
Distance to Windhoek -0.139 -0.00139
(0.203) (0.0961)
Observations 1,406 1,406 1,400 1,400 1,400
R2 0.000 0.025 0.242 0.243
Ethnicity FE no yes yes yes yes
Survey round FE no yes yes yes yes
Region FE no no yes yes yes
Individual-level controls no no yes yes yes
Mean of DV 3.814 3.814 3.821 3.821 3.821
Results from OLS regressions. The sample consists of observations from the 100km buffer
zone. Individual-level control variables are age, and income dummies. Standard errors (clus-
tered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
7 Conclusion
The results presented in this paper show that indirect colonial rule has persistent effects on con-
temporary political attitudes and behavior. We identified the effect of indirect rule by exploit-
ing a unique natural experiment in Namibia. Due to the effects of a 1897 rinderpest epidemic,
Namibia was divided into a southern region directly settled and ruled by colonial authorities
and a northern region that was indirectly ruled through a system of appointed indigenous tribal
elites, leading to exogenous variation in the form of colonial rule amongst members of the same
ethnic group20. Applying a spatial RDD, we found that individuals in indirectly ruled areas of
Namibia are less likely to support democracy as a form of governance and participate in voting
at elections.
Our evidence suggests that the mechanisms underlying this relationship are not demographic
factors such as education or income but rather are institutional - specifically, the institution
of traditional leadership. We argue that the ongoing local role that traditional authorities
play in formerly indirectly ruled areas of Namibia acts as a parallel undemocratic hierarchical
20Based on this empirical design, McNamee (2016) further analyzes the relationship between indirect colonial
rule and the political salience of ethnicity in Namibia.
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governance structure and socializes individuals in indirectly ruled areas to accept non-electoral
bases of legitimacy. This paper thereby contributes to a long-running debate in comparative
politics (Mamdani, 1996; Englebert, 2000; Williams, 2010; Logan, 2013; Baldwin, 2015) - it
does appear that the hereditary system of traditional leadership institutionalized by indirect
colonial rule may present a stumbling block to contemporary democratic political consolidation
in sub-Saharan Africa.
Our findings have potentially broad implications for our understanding of processes of de-
mocratization in the post-colonial context. Indirectly ruled countries are on average relatively
autocratic today, which Hariri (2012) influentially attributed to the reinforcement of traditional
authority in indirectly ruled areas and a relative lack of institutional transplantation by European
settlers. Our evidence suggests that a causal mechanism underlying this important aggregate
cross-national relationship is potentially cultural - indigenous Namibians in indirectly ruled areas
are less likely to believe that democracy is the only legitimate form of government or participate
in the electoral process. The relatively autocratic nature of indirectly ruled areas of the world
today may, therefore, be due in part to weaker general “demand” for electoral democracy as a
system of government21.
Whilst our evidence suggests that indirect colonial rule plays an important role in shaping
individual attitudes towards democracy, we do not wish to imply a mono-causal explanation for
variance in contemporary political culture in sub-Saharan Africa. Colonization is not destiny -
the legacy of indirect colonial rule, whilst important, can only explain part of the variance in
Namibia’s contemporary political culture. Rather, we want to highlight the fact that the ongoing
parallel existence of undemocratic local governance structures can partially undermine support
for democracy even in the context of a functional, largely successful national democratic polity.
This has potentially broad implications for democratization processes in other indirectly ruled
sub-Saharan African countries, where systems of traditional leadership still play an important
role in local governance and national democracy is not as consolidated as in Namibia.
Moreover, the fact that the institutional legacies of indirect rule may weaken support for
core democratic tenets in sub-Saharan Africa does not invalidate the extremely important and
valuable governing roles that traditional authorities currently play in their communities. Indeed,
it is likely in part because non-electoral mechanisms such as strong social ties have proven so
effective in keeping traditional leaders accountable and responsive to the needs of their commu-
nities and thus more effective than elected officials (Baldwin, 2015) that support for electoral
democracy as a system of government is weakened in areas with influential traditional lead-
ers. Despite the presence of a trade-off between influential local traditional institutions and
democratic consolidation, therefore, the policy mechanisms for improving overall quality of gov-
ernance in sub-Saharan Africa in the future remain more unclear and is a currently fruitful area
of research.22
21We depart slightly, however, from Hariri’s understanding of indirect rule by emphasizing the extent to which
indigenous political structures were also drastically changed in indirectly ruled areas of Namibia.
22As Baldwin and Mvukiyehe (2015) show, introducing elections for traditional authorities may actually have
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Ultimately, we hope that our findings documented in this paper encourage further research
about the competing legitimacy of different institutional configurations and the historical legacies
that continue to shape political culture in both sub-Saharan Africa and the wider world.
counter-productive effects on community collective action.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Ethnic groups prior to colonization
Figure 3: Ethnic groups prior to colonization (Murdock, 1967)
8.2 Comparison to other African countries
Table 10 shows Afrobarometer survey results from 2008 (survey round 4) for 19 other African
countries23 in comparison to the Namibia results. Contact to traditional leaders is lower in
Namibia than in other African countries. This shows that traditional leadership is an important
institutions in many African countries and that it is important to study its implications for the
viability of democratic systems. There is no clear difference in support for democracy between
Namibians and other sub-Saharan Africans in the sample.
23Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
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Table 10: Summary statistics of variables of interest for 20 African countries, covered in
Afrobarometer survey round 4
(1) (2) (3)
19 African countries Namibia Difference
Contact traditional ruler 0.55 0.38 0.17***
[0.99] [0.78] (0.029)
Trust traditional leaders 4.37 4.16 0.21***
[1.44] [1.17] (0.042)
Support for democracy 2.86 2.86 0.0062
[0.34] [0.35] (0.012)
Respect authority 2.22 2.52 -0.30***
[1.13] [1.02] (0.033)
Observations 26,513 1,200 27,713
8.3 Summary statistics
Table 11 summarizes the main variables of interests for the buffer zone. The number of obser-
vations differs as some variables are not available in all four survey rounds.
Table 11: Summary statistics for buffer zone
Mean SD Min Max Obs
Support for democracy 2.40 0.83 1 3 1352
Contact traditional leader 0.69 1.01 0 3 1426
Trust traditional leaders 1.91 0.91 0 3 1029
Respect authority 2.43 1.01 1 4 1373
Performance government 2.88 0.79 1 4 1360
Livestock suitability 4.21 1.05 2 6 1426
Urban 1.82 0.39 1 2 1426
Gender 0.49 0.50 0 1 1060
Age 35.75 14.81 18 92 1421
Education 3.81 1.85 0 8 1414




Table 12: Indirect rule and support for democracy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contact Contact Contact Respect Respect Respect
VARIABLES TL TL TL authority authority authority
Indirect colonial rule 0.189 0.485* 0.391** 0.245 0.204 0.210*
(0.223) (0.292) (0.172) (0.152) (0.186) (0.114)
Observations 1,418 1,418 1,418 1,365 1,365 1,365
R2 0.144 0.150 0.152 0.122 0.127 0.129
Lat/Lon yes no no yes no no
Dist. Windhoek quadr no yes no no yes no
Dist. Boundary quadr no no yes no no yes
Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Survey round FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
# clusters 165 165 165 165 165 165
Mean of DV 0.695 0.695 0.695 2.431 2.431 2.431
Results from OLS regressions. Individual-level control variables are age, education dummies and income
dummies. The sample consists of observations from the 100km buffer zone.. Standard errors (clustered by
Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
8.4.2 Different buffer sizes
The results are robust to using observations for the entire country and for a 50km buffer rather
than only focusing on the buffer zone. When decreasing the size of the buffer the number of
observations is too small using voting as an outcome and therefore the effect cannot be precisely
estimated.
28
Table 13: Indirect rule and support for democracy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Entire country Entire country 50km Buffer 50km Buffer
Indirect colonial rule -0.0941*** -0.0952* -0.161* -0.185**
(0.0328) (0.0505) (0.0881) (0.0877)
Distance to Windhoek -0.0227 -0.0173
(0.0251) (0.0880)
Constant 2.540*** 2.672*** 2.189*** 1.877***
(0.0455) (0.281) (0.151) (0.434)
Observations 4,656 4,598 620 607
R2 0.008 0.037 0.044 0.091
Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes
Survey round FE yes yes yes yes
Region FE no yes no yes
Individual-level controls no yes no yes
# clusters 571 571 77 77
Mean of DV 2.424 2.421 2.382 2.386
Results from OLS regressions. Individual-level control variables are age, education dummies and income
dummies. The sample consists observations for the entire country and a 50km buffer respectively. Standard
errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 14: Indirect rule and voting
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Entire country Entire country 50km Buffer 50km Buffer
Indirect colonial rule 0.0200 -0.0487 -0.0963 -0.0703
(0.0240) (0.0417) (0.0638) (0.0645)
Distance to Windhoek 0.00509 -0.142***
(0.0177) (0.0527)
Observations 2,711 2,680 392 387
R2 0.036 0.186 0.066 0.242
Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes
Survey round FE yes yes yes yes
Region FE no yes no yes
Individual-level controls no yes no yes
# clusters 335 335 48 48
Mean of DV 0.733 0.733 0.747 0.749
Results from OLS regressions. Individual-level control variables are age, education dummies and income
dummies. The sample consists observations for the entire country and a 50km buffer respectively. Standard
errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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8.4.3 Placebo Buffer
Table 15: Indirect rule and support for democracy: Placebo buffers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Support for Support for Support for Support for
VARIABLES democracy democracy democracy democracy
Placebo indirect (south) 0.0532 -0.167
(0.119) (0.166)
Placebo indirect (north) -0.105 -0.0252
(0.0840) (0.102)
Distance to Windhoek 0.246* -0.0526
(0.125) (0.121)
Observations 324 320 927 917
R2 0.067 0.154 0.028 0.092
Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes
Survey round FE yes yes yes yes
Region FE no yes no yes
Individual-level controls no yes no yes
# clusters 42 42 114 114
Mean of DV 2.349 2.356 2.383 2.382
Results from OLS regressions. Individual-level control variables are age, education dummies and
income dummies. The sample consists of observations from the 100km buffer zone. Standard errors
(clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 16: Indirect rule and voting: Placebo buffers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Voting Voting Voting Voting
Placebo indirect (south) -0.00805 -0.142
(0.0800) (0.104)
Placebo indirect (north) 0.0278 0.110*
(0.0591) (0.0622)
Distance to Windhoek 0.0304 -0.0275
(0.106) (0.0596)
Observations 186 184 546 540
R2 0.078 0.340 0.073 0.287
Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes
Survey round FE yes yes yes yes
Region FE no yes no yes
Individual-level controls no yes no yes
# clusters 23 23 68 68
Mean of DV 0.720 0.717 0.722 0.722
Results from OLS regressions. Individual-level control variables are age, ed-
ucation dummies and income dummies. The sample consists of observations
from the 100km buffer zone. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area)
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
8.4.4 Different clustering
The results are robust to clustering the standard errors on the constituency level (table 17).
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Table 17: Indirect rule and support for democracy and voting: clustering SE
on a constituency level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Support Support Voting Voting
VARIABLES for democracy for democracy
Indirect colonial rule -0.178** -0.223* -0.122* -0.166**
(0.0768) (0.130) (0.0615) (0.0802)
Distance to Windhoek -0.0228 -0.0389
(0.0752) (0.0469)
Observations 1,347 1,329 734 723
R2 0.019 0.043 0.049 0.287
Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes
Survey round FE yes yes yes yes
Region FE no yes no yes
Individual-level controls no yes no yes
# clusters 44 44 38 38
Results from OLS regressions. Individual-level control variables are age, education dummies
and income dummies. The sample consists of observations from the 100km buffer zone. Stan-
dard errors (clustered by Constituency) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
8.5 Interaction effects
In addition, we tested whether there is an interaction effect between indirect colonial rule and
survey round fixed effects. The results in table 18 indicate that there is no such interaction
effect. Hence, the effect of indirect colonial rule on political attitudes does not decrease (or
increase) over time, which suggests that political attitudes are indeed persistent.
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Table 18: Interaction between indirect colonial rule and survey round fixed
effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Support Support Voting Voting
VARIABLES for democracy for democracy
Indirect colonial rule -0.329** -0.400** -0.0949 -0.130
(0.160) (0.178) (0.0587) (0.0866)
Indirect rule x round 2 0.169 0.200
(0.191) (0.210)
Indirect rule x round 3 0.0924 0.141 -0.0521 -0.0922
(0.199) (0.207) (0.0795) (0.0793)
Indirect rule x round 4 0.288 0.315
(0.204) (0.223)
Distance to Windhoek -0.0156 -0.0312
(0.0788) (0.0545)
Round = 2 -0.0646 -0.0960
(0.176) (0.191)
Round = 3 0.104 0.0282
(0.182) (0.189)
Round = 4 -0.141 -0.179 -0.194** -0.247***
(0.188) (0.208) (0.0748) (0.0744)
Observations 1,347 1,329 734 723
R2 0.022 0.046 0.049 0.288
Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes
Survey round FE yes yes yes yes
Region FE no yes no yes
Individual-level controls no yes no yes
# clusters 165 165 91 91
Results from OLS regressions including interaction terms between colonial rule and survey round
fixed effects as well as ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. Individual-level control variables
are age, education dummies and income dummies. The sample consists observations for the 100km
buffer zone only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Finally, we analyzed interactions between indirect rule and age using both the reported age
and a binary age measure (table 19). The binary measure divides the sample in people older
and younger than 31, which is the median age in the sample. Neither of the estimations yields
statistically significant effects of the interaction. This demonstrates that the effect of indirect
colonial rule on political attitudes does not depend on age. The effect is thus not stronger for
older people who experienced colonial rule longer than younger people.
Table 19: No interaction effect between indirect colonial rule and age
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Support Support Voting Voting
VARIABLES for democracy for democracy
Indirect colonial rule -0.115 -0.225* -0.338** -0.241**
(0.188) (0.128) (0.153) (0.0942)




Distance to Windhoek -0.0205 -0.0184 -0.0402 -0.0432
(0.0788) (0.0762) (0.0566) (0.0553)
Indirect rule x Old dummy 0.00571 0.183**
(0.109) (0.0877)
Old dummy -0.00154 -0.0248
(0.0981) (0.0784)
Observations 1,329 1,334 723 723
R2 0.043 0.046 0.290 0.299
Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes
Survey round FE yes yes yes yes
Region FE yes yes yes yes
Individual-level controls yes yes yes yes
# clusters 165 165 91 91
Results from OLS regressions including interaction terms between colonial rule and age as well as
ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. Individual-level control variables are age, education dummies
and income dummies. The sample consists observations for the buffer zone only. Standard errors
(clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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8.6 Afrobarometer survey questions
Afrobarometer survey questions uesed in this paper (Afrobarometer, 2008).
Outcome variables
• Support for democracy: Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?
Statement 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.
Statement 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.
Statement 3: For someone like me, it does not matter what kind of government we have.
1= Statement 2: Non-democratic preferable, 2=Statement 3: For someone like me, it does
not matter what kind of government we have, 3=Statement 1: Democracy preferable
• Voting: With regard to the most recent national elections, which statement is true for
you?
0= You decided not to vote
1= You voted in the elections
We dropped observations from respondents who reported that they could not find the polling
station, were prevented from voting, did not have time to vote or not vote for some other
reason. This constitutes less than 3% of the sample.
• Contact traditional leader: During the past year, how often have you contacted any
of the following persons about some important problem or to give them your views: A
traditional ruler?
0=Never, 1=Only once, 2=A few times, 3=Often
• Respect for authority: Let’s talk for a moment about the kind of society we would like
to have in this country. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose
Statement 1 or Statement 2.
Statement 1: Citizens should be more active in questioning the actions of leaders.
Statement 2: In our country, citizens should show more respect for authority.
1=Agree very strongly with Statement 1, 2=Agree with Statement 1, 3=Agree with State-
ment 2, 4=Agree very strongly with Statement 2
• Trust traditional leader: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you
heard enough about them to say: Traditional leaders
0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot
Control variables
• How often gone without food: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your
family gone without: Enough food to eat?
0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always
• Education: What is the highest level of education you have completed?
0=No formal schooling, 1=Informal schooling, 2=Some primary schooling, 3=Primary
school completed, 4=Some secondary school/ High school, 5=Secondary school completed/High
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school, 6=Post-secondary qualifications, other than university, 7=Some university, 8=Uni-
versity completed, 9=Post-graduate
• Performance of local government councilor: Do you approve or disapprove of the
way the following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven’t
you heard enough about them to say: Your Elected Local Government Councillor?
1=Strongly Disapprove, 2=Disapprove, 3=Approve, 4=Strongly Approve
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